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Prediction of future rewards and discrepancy between actual and expected outcomes
(prediction error) are crucial signals for adaptive behavior. In humans, a number of fMRI
studies demonstrated that reward probability modulates these two signals in a large
brain network. Yet, the spatio-temporal dynamics underlying the neural coding of reward
probability remains unknown. Here, using magnetoencephalography, we investigated the
neural dynamics of prediction and reward prediction error computations while subjects
learned to associate cues of slot machines with monetary rewards with different
probabilities. We showed that event-related magnetic fields (ERFs) arising from the
visual cortex coded the expected reward value 155ms after the cue, demonstrating that
reward value signals emerge early in the visual stream. Moreover, a prediction error was
reflected in ERF peaking 300ms after the rewarded outcome and showing decreasing
amplitude with higher reward probability. This prediction error signal was generated in
a network including the anterior and posterior cingulate cortex. These findings pinpoint
the spatio-temporal characteristics underlying reward probability coding. Together, our
results provide insights into the neural dynamics underlying the ability to learn probabilistic
stimuli-reward contingencies.
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INTRODUCTION
Predicting the occurrence of potentially rewarding events is
a critical ability for adaptive behavior. Compelling evidence
from single-unit recording in non-human primates indicate that
reward probability modulates midbrain dopaminergic neurons
activity both at the time of the conditioned stimuli when a
prediction is made and at the time of outcome, when the discrep-
ancy between actual and expected outcome is computed (Fiorillo
et al., 2003). During appetitive classical conditioning, the pha-
sic response of dopamine neurons increases with higher reward
probability at the time of the conditioned stimulus (CS) and
decreases at the time of the outcome (Fiorillo et al., 2003; Tobler
et al., 2005; Kobayashi and Schultz, 2008). In humans, recent
microelectrode recordings also indicate that substantia nigra
neurons exhibit higher firing rates after unexpected gains than
unexpected losses (Zaghloul et al., 2009). These findings sup-
port the hypotheses that midbrain dopaminergic neurons code
the expected reward value at the time of the conditioned stimuli
and a prediction error signal at the outcome, representing the dis-
crepancy between anticipated and rewards effectively delivered.
Building on monkey electrophysiological experiments, a number
of recent fMRI studies investigated the influence of probabil-
ity on reward-related brain activity (Elliott et al., 2003; Knutson
et al., 2005; Abler et al., 2006; Dreher et al., 2006; Preuschoff
et al., 2006; Tobler et al., 2007). Although most of these stud-
ies focused on reward probability coding in the ventral striatum,
the representations of reward expectation and of reward predic-
tion errors are not confined to subcortical regions and are also
found in cingulate, prefrontal, and intra-parietal cortices (Platt
and Glimcher, 1999; Fletcher et al., 2001; Ridderinkhof et al.,
2004; Sugrue et al., 2004; Dreher et al., 2006).
Much less is known concerning the representations of reward
properties in early visual structures. However, recent theoret-
ical proposals and empirical findings in humans support the
view that reward properties, such as reward timing (Shuler and
Bear, 2006) and prior reward history of stimuli (Serences, 2008;
Gavornik et al., 2009) may be coded in areas of the visual system,
including V1. Moreover, a recent fMRI study in monkeys showed
that dopaminergic signals can modulate visual cortical activity,
directly demonstrating that reward help to regulate selective plas-
ticity within the visual representation of reward predicting stimuli
(Arsenault et al., 2013). These studies challenge the common view
that only after initial processing of low-level stimulus features in
the visual cortex are higher order cortical areas engaged to process
the significance of visual input and its predictive value.
The vast majority of neuroimaging studies performed in
humans used fMRI to investigate the influence of reward prob-
ability on the brain. However, because of the low temporal reso-
lution of fMRI, it has not been possible to investigate the precise
timing of reward probability coding and their spatio-temporal
characteristics during conditioning tasks using designs with short
CS-outcome period as those used in animal experiments, nor to
separate events temporally close within these tasks (Fiorillo et al.,
2003; Dreher et al., 2006; Tobler et al., 2007). Other approaches
using techniques with high temporal resolution, such as EEG,
have focused on the neural mechanisms of feedback evaluation
when subjects evaluate outcomes of their actions and use these
evaluations to guide decision-making (Gehring and Willoughby,
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2002; Holroyd et al., 2004; Cohen et al., 2007; Christie and Tata,
2009). However, these types of tasks may not involve the same
processes as those required in classical conditioning.
Here, we report a new MEG study investigating the spatio-
temporal neural dynamics of prediction and reward prediction
errors computations by focusing on the timing of responses
to predictive cues and rewarded/unrewarded outcomes when
humans learned probabilistic associations of visual cues of slot
machines with monetary rewards. We characterized the effects
of reward probability on evoked magnetic fields occurring dur-
ing the computations underlying reward prediction and reward
prediction error.
METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Twelve right-handed subjects (seven males) participated in this
MEG experiment (mean age± SD 23.08 ± 2.23 years). They were
all university students, and were free of psychiatric and neurolog-
ical problems as well as of drug abuse and history of pathological
gambling. Four subjects (3 males) were excluded from the data
analysis because of large head movements (>5mm). All sub-
jects gave their written, informed consent to participate in this
study, which was approved by the local ethics committee. The
subjects were paid for their participation, and earned extramoney
in proportion to their gains during the experiment.
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE
Subjects were presented with 10 runs of 4 blocks with the
same elementary structure (Figure 1). In each block, one single
slot machine was presented on a computer screen during 20
consecutive trials (ITI = 1.5 ± 0.5 s). Each slot machine was
made visually unique by displaying a particular fractal image
on top of it. In each run, 4 types of slot machines were pre-
sented in random order and unbeknownst to the subjects were
attached to 4 reward probabilities (P = 0; 0.25; 0.5; 0.75). A
total of 10 ∗ 4 = 40 different slot machines were presented. The
probability of each slot machine was exact and reached at the
end of each block. The paradigm is similar to the one used in
a previous intra-cranial recording study (Vanni-Mercier et al.,
2009). Briefly, the subjects’ task was to estimate at each trial
the reward probability of each slot machine at the time of its
presentation, based upon all the previous outcomes of the slot
machine until this trial (i.e., estimate of cumulative probability
since the first trial). To do so, subjects had to press one of two
response-buttons: one button indicating that, overall, the slot
machine had a “high winning probability” and the other but-
ton indicating that overall, the slot machine had a “low winning
probability.” Thus, the task was not to predict whether the cur-
rent slot machine would be rewarded or not rewarded on the
current trial. Subjects were told that their current estimate had
no influence on subsequent reward occurrence. During the task,
subjects received no feed-back relative to their correct/incorrect
estimation of the winning probability of the slot machine. Finally,
at the end of each block, they were asked to classify the slot
machine on a scale from 0 to 4 according to their global estimate
of reward delivery over the block. The experimental paradigm
was implemented with the Presentation software (http://nbs.
neuro-bs.com/presentation).
FIGURE 1 | Experimental paradigm. Subjects estimated the reward
probability of 4 types of slot machines that varied with respect to
monetary reward probabilities P (0, 0.25, 0.5, and 0.75). The slot
machines could be discriminated by specific fractal images on top of
them. Trials were self-paced and were composed of 4 distinct phases:
(1) Slot machine presentation (S1): subjects pressed one of two
response-keys to estimate whether the slot machine frequently
delivered 20€ or not, over all the past trials; (2) Delay period (1.5 s):
Subject’s key press triggered 3 spinners to roll around and to
successively stop every 0.5 s during 0.5 s; (3) Outcome S2 (lasting
0.5 s): the 3rd spinner stopped spinning revealing the trial outcome (i.e.,
fully informing the subject on subsequent reward or no reward
delivery). Only two configurations were possible at the time the third
spinner stopped: “bar, bar, seven” (no reward) or “bar, bar, bar”
(reward); (4) Reward/No reward delivery (1 s): picture of 20€ bill or
rectangle with 0€ written inside.
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MEG RECORDINGS AND MRI ANATOMICAL SCANS
MEG recordings were carried out in a magnetically shielded room
with a helmet shaped 275 channels gradiometer whole-head
system (OMEGA; CTF Systems, VSM Medtech, Vancouver,
BC, Canada). The subjects were comfortably seated upright,
instructed to maintain their heads motionless and to refrain from
blinking. Head motions were restricted by using a head stabi-
lizer bladder. Between runs, subjects could have a short rest with
eye blinking allowed, but were asked to stay still. Visual stim-
uli were projected on a translucent screen positioned 1.5m from
the subject. The subject’s head position relative to MEG sensors
was recorded at the beginning and end of each run using three
anatomical fiducials (coils fixed at the nasion and at left and right
preauricular points). These coils were also used to co-register
the MEG sensor positions with the individual anatomical MRI.
Subject’s head position was readjusted between runs to maintain
the same position all along the experiment. Subjects with head
movements larger than 5mm were excluded from the study. The
mean head movement of the subjects included in the analysis was
3.5 ± 0.8mm.
Anatomical MRI scans were obtained for each subject using
a high resolution T1-weighted sequence (magnetization pre-
pared gradient echo sequence, MP-RAGE: 176 1.0mm sagital
slices; FOV = 256mm, NEX = 1, TR = 1970ms, TE = 3.93ms;
matrix = 256 × 256; TI = 1100ms, bandwidth = 130Hz/pixel
for 256 pixels in-plane resolution = 1mm3).
MEG signals were sampled at 600Hz with a 300Hz cut-off
filter and stored together with electro-oculogram (EOG), electro-
cardiogram (ECG) signals, and digital markers of specific events
for subsequent off-line analysis. These markers included: 4 mark-
ers at the cue (slot machine appearance: S1) corresponding to
the 4 reward probabilities of the slot machines (P0, 0.25, 0.5, and
0.75), 2markers at the subject’s behavioral responses, and 7mark-
ers at the outcome (i.e., when the 3rd spinner stops spinning: S2),
defined according to the 7 possible outcomes (3 rewarded slot
machines, 3 unrewarded slot machines, and one with only unre-
warded outcomes).
BEHAVIORAL DATA ANALYSIS
We computed the percentage of correct estimations of the reward
probability for each slot machine as a function of trial rank (from
1 to 20) averaged over subjects and runs (Figure 2). Estimations
were defined as correct when subjects classified as “low winning”
the slot machines with low reward probabilities (P = 0 and P =
0.25) and as “high winning” the slot machines with high reward
probability (P = 0.75). Since the slot machine with reward prob-
ability P = 0.5 had neither “low” nor “high” winning probability
and the choice was binary, the percent of 50% estimates of “high
winning,” or symmetrically of “low winning” probability, corre-
sponded to the correct estimate of winning probability for this
slot machine.
For the probabilities P0, P0.25, and P0.75, the trial rank when
learning occurred (learning criterion) was defined as the trial
rank with at least 80% of correct responses and for which the
percent of correct estimation did not decrease below this limit
for the remaining trials. For the probability P = 0.5, the trial
rank when learning occurred was defined as the trial rank with
FIGURE 2 | Behavioral performance. Mean learning curves averaged
across subjects, expressed as the mean percentage of “high probability of
winning” (top) and “low probability of winning” (bottom) estimations of
the four slot machines, as a function of trial rank. Vertical bars represent
standard errors of the mean. Each slot machine is color coded (with reward
probability from 0 to 0.75). Note that the subjects’ task was simply to
estimate at each trial the reward probability of each slot machine at the
time of its presentation, based upon all the previous outcomes of the slot
machine until this trial (i.e., estimate of cumulative probability since the first
trial). To do so, subjects had to press one of two response-buttons: “high
winning probability” and “low winning probability.” In particular, the
estimation of the slot machine with P = 0.5 of winning reached the learning
criterion (i.e., >80% correct estimations) after the 7th trial (estimations
oscillating around 50% as “high” or “low” probability of winning).
approximately 50% of the responses being either “high” or “low
winning” probability and then oscillating around this value for
the remaining trials. Moreover, results from subjects’ estimation
of the slot machines for each of the 20 successive presentations of
a single type of slot machine within runs were compared to their
classification made at the end of each block. We also analyzed the
response time (RT) as a function of reward probability.
MEG DATA PROCESSING
MEG signals were converted to a 3rd order synthetic gradi-
ent, decimated at 300Hz, Direct Current (DC) corrected and
band-pass filtered between 0.1 and 30Hz. They were then pro-
cessed with the software package for electrophysiological analyses
(ELAN-Pack) developed at the INSERM U821 laboratory (Lyon,
France; http://u821.lyon.inserm.fr/index_en.php). Trials with eye
blinks or muscle activity were discarded after visual inspection, as
well as cardiac artifacts, using the program DataHandler devel-
oped at the CNRS-LENA UPR 640 laboratory (Paris, France,
http://cogimage.dsi.cnrs.fr/index.htm) (∼10% of rejection in
total). Signals were averaged with respect to the markers at S1 and
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S2 using epochs of 3500ms (−1500 to 2000ms from the markers)
with a 1000ms baseline correction. Baseline activity was defined
as the average activity during the ITI.
MEG DATA ANALYSIS
Event-related magnetic fields
For each reward probability, we ensured the statistical significance
of the ERFs observed at the cue presentation (S1) and at the
outcome (S2) compared to the baseline with a Wilcoxon test per-
formed on epochs of 3500ms, with a moving time-window of
20ms shifted by 2ms step.
Next, we examined the relationship between ERFs peak ampli-
tudes and reward probability at the group level at S1 and S2, using
an ANOVA with reward probability as independent factor. Post-
hoc comparisons were then performed using Tukey’s HSD tests
to further assess the significant differences between ERFs peak
amplitudes as a function of probability. In addition, we deter-
mined the mean onset latencies, peak latencies, and durations of
the ERFs time-locked to S1 and S2.
Sources reconstruction at S1
Sources reconstruction of averaged ERFs was performed accord-
ing to two different methods at S1. We used the dipolefit analysis
(DipoleFit, CTF Systems, Inc., Vancouver, BC, Canada) for the
ERFs observed at S1 because at the time of the cue the scalp dis-
tribution of ERFs was clearly dipolar (Figure 3A). An advantage
of this technique is that dipole pairs can be fitted to each indi-
vidual dataset separately. The signal time-window used for dipole
localization was 90–150ms after S1, during the rising phase of
the ERFs up to its point of maximal amplitude, because this
rising phase is considered to reflect the primary source activa-
tion of the signal. No a priori hypothesis was made concerning
the localization of dipoles necessary to explain the MEG activity
recorded at the sensors level. For each source given by the default
settings of the analysis software, the residual variance was calcu-
lated and the potential source was accepted if the residual variance
was less than 15%. We added dipoles in a parsimonious way to
reach this threshold. For each subject, 2 or 3 dipoles explained
the signal with 85% of goodness-of-fit, but only the first dipole
was observed in each individual subject at similar location in the
visual cortex. Therefore, we considered this first dipole as the
most plausible and its localization was performed in each subject
using the BrainVoyager software (http://www.brainvoyager.com).
The final criterion for the acceptance of the defined potential
dipole was its physiological plausibility (location in gray matter
and amplitude<250 nA m). Finally, we performed the analysis of
dipole moments amplitudes as a function of reward probability at
the group level with a multifactorial ANOVA.
Sources reconstruction at S2
For the sources reconstruction of the ERFs observed at S2, we
used the Synthetic Aperture Magnetometry (SAM) methodology
FIGURE 3 | MEG response sensitive to the conditioned stimulus at the
time of the cue (S1). (A) Top: Scalp topography of the M150. Evoked related
magnetic fields maps averaged across all participants showing a linear
increase with reward probability at the time of the peak amplitude (=155ms)
after cue presentation (S1). Color scale indicates the intensity of the
magnetic field. Color dots indicate occipital sensors (sensors MLO11,
MLO12, MLO22) where the ERFs showed a significant modulation by reward
probability (Yellow dots: P < 0.05; white dots: P < 0.1). Bottom: Grand
average MEG waveform on one selected occipital sensor in the left
hemisphere (sensor MLO11) for the presentation of the slot machines (cue at
S1), linearly modulated by reward probability (P = 0: yellow, P = 0.25: green,
P = 0.5: red, P = 0.75: blue). (B) Source localization showing highly
reproducible dipoles on saggital slices in each subject (n = 8). (C) Linear
increase with reward probability of the dipolar moment’s amplitudes of the
first dipole explaining the activity elicited by the cue. Stars represent
statistical differences found with a Tukey post-hoc between dipolar moment’s
amplitudes ∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.005; ∗∗∗p < 0.0005; ∗∗∗∗p < 0.00005. Vertical
bars represent standard errors of the mean.
Frontiers in Neuroscience | Decision Neuroscience November 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 214 | 4
Thomas et al. Dynamics of reward probability coding
(CTF Systems, Inc., Vancouver, BC, Canada) because in this case,
the MEG signals were more complex (multipeaked) and their
scalp distribution was clearly multipolar. SAM is an adaptive spa-
tial filtering algorithm or “beamformer.” The beamformer is a
linear combination of the signals recorded on all sensors, opti-
mized such that the signal estimated at a point is unattenuated
while remote correlated interfering sources are suppressed. It
links each voxel in the brain with the MEG sensors by con-
structing an optimum spatial filter for that location (Van Veen
et al., 1997; Robinson and Vrba, 1999). This spatial filter is a
set of weights and the source strength at the target location is
computed as the weighted sum of all the MEG sensors. The
algorithms of the SAM method are reported in (Hillebrand and
Barnes, 2005). SAM examines the changes in signal power in
a certain frequency band between two conditions for each vol-
ume element. We applied SAM to the 0.1–40Hz frequency band
to provide a statistical measure of the difference in the signal
power of the two experimental conditions over the same time-
window. We compared the two extreme reward probabilities at
S2. That is, we focused on searching the sources showing a
difference in power between P = 0.25 and P = 0.75 at S2 for
rewarded trials (reflecting a prediction error). The time-window
chosen for the analysis of the ERFs included the first ERF peak,
in accordance with the significant effects observed on the sen-
sors that is, from 0 to 300ms. SAM analysis was applied on
the whole brain volume with a 2.5mm voxel resolution. The
true t-test value was calculated at each voxel with a Jackknife
approach. The Jackknife method enables accurate determination
of trial-by-trial variability, while integrating the multiple covari-
ance matrices over all but one trial. For each of these covariance
matrices, SAM computes the source power on a voxel by voxel
basis.
These statistical SAM data were superimposed on individual
MRI data of each subject and statistical parametric maps rep-
resenting significant voxels as color volumes were generated in
each subject. We then performed a co-registration of the individ-
ual subjects’ statistical maps on a “mean” brain obtained from all
subjects. At the individual level, p-values < 0.05 were considered
as significant (i.e., t > 2, Jackknife test). At the group level, the
anatomical source locations were reported (Tables 1, 2) and dis-
played (Figure 5) if at least half of the subjects reached a statistical
significance of t > 2 (Jackknife test).
RESULTS
BEHAVIORAL RESULTS
Estimation of reward probability
A multifactorial ANOVA performed on the percent of cor-
rect estimates of the probability of winning (low likelihood
of winning for P0 and P0.25, high likelihood of winning
for P0.75 and 50% of each alternative for P0.5) showed that
both reward probability (P) and trial rank (R) influenced
the percentage of correct estimations [FP(3, 1460) = 220.2, p <
0.0001; FR(19, 1460) = 16.7, p < 0.0001]. The trial rank at which
learning occurred depended on reward probability [interac-
tion between trial rank and probability: FR ∗ P(57, 1460) = 6.9,
p < 0.001]: that is, reward probability P0 reached the learn-
ing criterion (i.e., >80% correct estimations) after the 2nd
Table 1 | Sources localizations of the first individual dipoles found at
S1 reported in Talairach space, and their corresponding ellipsoid of
confidence volume (p ≥ 95%).
Anatomical structures Reward value Volume error (cm3)
x y z
CS −8 −87 9 0.72
CS −4 −87 0 0.001
CS/Cuneus −2 −86 16 0.035
CS/Cuneus 2 −87 21 0.01
CS 1 −86 −3 0.24
CS 3 −73 21 0.69
CS 3 76 19 0.59
CS 5 −65 19 0.77
Abbreviation: CS, Calcarine Sulcus.
Table 2 | Sources localizations of ERFs found at S2 for all the
subjects, in Talairach space.
Anatomical structures Reward prediction error
x y z
ACC 5 43 19
Post. ACC 5 −36 48
Precuneus 5 −2 54
SMG −26 −38 44
Abbreviations: ACC, Anterior Cingulate Cortex; SMG, Supramarginal gyrus.
trial, while the reward probabilities P0.25 and 0.75 reached
the learning criterion after the 5th (respectively 84.9 and
80.7% correct estimations). The reward probability P0.5 reached
the learning criterion after the 7th trial (estimations oscillat-
ing around 50% as “high” or “low” probability of winning)
(Figure 2).
In addition, the global estimate of reward delivery performed
over each block confirmed that subjects learned the reward
probability of each slot machine: they made 97.5% of correct
estimations for reward probability P = 0; 77.5% for P = 0.25;
68.8% for P = 0.75 and 82.5% for P = 0.5.
Together, these behavioral results indicate that learning of
cue-outcome contingencies was performed rapidly for each type
of slot machine (even for the slot machine with P = 0.5).
Thus, because the learning criterion was reached rapidly (in
2–7 trials) the effect of learning on MEG signals could not be
studied and the MEG signals were analyzed after averaging all
trials.
RESPONSE TIMES (RTs)
RTs were analyzed using a One-Way ANOVA with reward
probability (P) as independent factor. No main effect of the prob-
ability of the slot machines on RT [F(3, 8696) = 1.4, p = 0.238]
was observed. The mean RT ± SEM for all reward probabilities
and trials was: 673.3 ± 28.2ms.
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MEG SIGNALS
MEG-evoked responses at the sensor level
Modulation of ERFs observed at the cue (S1) by reward
probability. In each subject, strong ERFs emerged at left occip-
ital sensors (MLO 11, 12, 22) around 90ms after S1 (appearance
of the slot machine), peaking at 155ms ± 13ms and lasting up to
260ms ± 11.4ms after the cue onset. We therefore analyzed the
ERFs averaged across all subjects. For each type of slot machine
(i.e., reward probability), this emerging signal was significantly
different from baseline during a time window varying from 35 to
265ms around the maximal amplitude (Wilcoxon tests, p-values
varying from<0.0001 to<0.02 at the different sensors). At all the
occipital sensors showing the ERFs at S1, there was a main effect
of reward probability on the peak amplitude of these ERFs (110 to
137 fT) [ANOVA with probability as independent factor: MLO11:
F(3, 5580) = 6.3, p < 0.0005; MLO12: F(3, 5580) = 2.8, p < 0. 05,
MLO22: F(3, 5580) = 2.6, p < 0.05]. Moreover, a test of linear-
ity (Spearman) revealed that these ERFs increased linearly with
reward probability at all these sensors, being minimal for P0.25
and maximal for P0.75 (p < 0.05) (Figure 3A).
Modulation of ERFs observed at S2 by reward probability.
Early complex ERFs emerged over occipital and temporal areas
110 ± 11.4ms after each successive stop of the three spin-
ners of the slot machines, peaking 300 ± 16.5ms after and
lasting 450 ± 13.2ms. Only after the third spinner stopped,
giving full information about upcoming outcome (S2), was the
peak amplitude of these ERFs (68–99 fT), observed at occipi-
tal and temporal sensors (MRO34, MRT15, MRT26, MRT27),
modulated by reward probability (Figures 4A,B). This signal was
significantly different from baseline for each reward probabil-
ity during a time window varying from 20 to 450ms around
the maximal amplitude for rewarded trials (Wilcoxon tests, p-
values varying from <0.0001 to <0.043). ANOVAs performed
at the group level showed a main effect of probability. That
is, reward probability modulated ERFs’ peak amplitudes for
rewarded trials [sensors MRO34: FProbability(2, 2173) = 10.8, p <
0.00005; MRT 15: FProbability(2, 2173) = 5.2, p < 0.05; MRT 26:
Fprobability(2, 2173) = 7.1, p < 0.005; MRT27: FProbability(2, 2173) =
3.6, p < 0.05]. Moreover, tests of linearity (Spearman) between
ERFs’ peak amplitudes and reward probability at all these sites
were significant, decreasing linearly from P = 0.25 to P = 0.75
for rewarded trials (p < 0.05).
SOURCES RECONSTRUCTIONS OF ERFs
Sources reconstruction at S1
The localization of the dipole source of the ERFs observed at
S1 was consistently assigned to the calcarine sulcus for 6 of the
8 subjects and to the cuneus/calcarine junction for the remain-
ing 2 subjects (Figure 3B and Table 1). The relationship between
the amplitudes of these dipolar moments averaged across sub-
jects and reward probability monotonically increased with reward
probability, being minimal for P = 0.25 and maximal for P =
0.75. An ANOVA at the group level, with reward probability as
independent factor showed a main effect of reward probability
on dipolar moment amplitude’s [F(3, 5580) = 14.8, p < 5.10−6]
(Figure 3C). A subsequent test of linearity (Spearman) between
dipolarmoments amplitudes and reward probability revealed that
these dipolar moments amplitudes increased linearly with reward
probability (p < 0.05) (Figure 3C).
Sources reconstruction at S2
In all subjects but one, SAM activation maps identified a set of
sources of the ERFs observed at the outcome S2 for rewarded trials
as a function of reward probability. When comparing the sources
powers between the lowest (P = 0.25) and the highest (P = 0.75)
rewarded probability, we observed that the anterior and posterior
cingulate cortices, the precuneus and the supramarginal gyrus
(Brodmann’s area 40) were more activated by the lowest (P =
0.25) than the highest (P = 0.75) rewarded probability (Figure 5
and Table 2) (Jackknife tests, t > 2).
DISCUSSION
This study used a probabilistic reward task to characterize the
spatio-temporal dynamics of cerebral activity underlying reward
processing using MEG. Two important results emerge from the
FIGURE 4 | MEG response occurring during spinner’s rotations and
at the time of the outcome S2. (A) Averaged signal from a
representative selected occipital site (sensor MRO34), during spinners’
rotation and showing a linear modulation with reward probability when
the third spinner stopped (S2) for rewarded trials (Reward probability
P = 0.25: green; P = 0.5: red; P = 0.75: blue). Color dots on the
map’s brain indicate sensors where there was a statistical difference
between peaks amplitudes for rewarded trials as a function of reward
probability (blue dots: P < 0.05, black dots: P < 0.1). (B) ERF’s peak
amplitudes from a representative selected occipital site (sensor
MRO34) modulated by reward probability for unrewarded outcomes.
Stars represent statistical differences (Tukey post-hoc between different
probabilities. ∗P < 0.05; ∗∗∗P < 0.0005). Vertical bars represent standard
errors of the mean.
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FIGURE 5 | Synthetic Aperture Magnetometry activation maps
reflecting reward prediction error at S2. SAM activation maps showing
higher activity with lower reward probability for rewarded trials at the time
the third spinner stopped (S2). Rewarded trials at P = 0.25 vs. rewarded
trials at P = 0.75 induced a variation in the power of the sources in the
anterior cingulate cortices, the precuneus, and the supramarginal gyrus.
Color maps indicate the number of subjects showing a difference in source
power for lower reward probability for rewarded trials at the outcome S2
with t > 2 (Jackknife test).
present study: (1) reward value is coded early (155ms) after the
cue in the visual cortex; (2) prediction error is coded 300ms
after the outcome S2 (i.e., when the third spinner stops, fully
informing subjects on subsequent reward/no reward delivery)
in a network involving the anterior and posterior cingulate cor-
tices. Moreover, reward probability modulates both ERFs coding
reward prediction at the cue and prediction error at the outcome.
EARLY REWARD VALUE CODING AT THE TIME OF THE CUE
We found early evoked-related magnetic fields (ERFs) arising
around 90ms and peaking 155ms after the cue presentation over
the occipital cortex (M150) (Figure 3A). Dipole source localiza-
tion showed that this early response observed at mid-occipital
site was most probably generated in primary visual areas (cal-
carine sulcus) and to a lesser extent in secondary visual areas
(Figure 3B). The amplitude of dipolar moments corresponding
to these sources increased linearly with reward probability, indi-
cating that visual areas code the reward value of the cue very
early (Figure 3C). The ERFs observed at the cue are unlikely
to represent the response to low level stimulus attributes of the
fractal displayed on the slot machine because each of these frac-
tals was associated with a distinct reward probability in each
block, and the ERFs associated to each probability represents the
mean response to all the different fractals having the same reward
probability averaged over the ten runs.
Several studies have documented value-based modulations in
different areas of the visual system. In rodents, primary visual cor-
tex neurons code the timing of reward delivery (Shuler and Bear,
2006) and in humans, the visual primary cortex was found to be
modulated by prior reward history in a two-choice task (Serences,
2008), showing that primary visual areas are not exclusively
involved in processing low-level stimuli properties. Our results
extend these findings in two important ways: first, by revealing
that reward value is coded early in the primary visual cortex dur-
ing a conditioning paradigm, and second, by showing that reward
probability effectively modulates this early signal in a parametric
way. The representation of reward value in early visual areas could
be useful to increase attention to the cues having higher reward
probability and to bias decisions for high value cues. Consistent
with our finding, a recent EEG/MEG study investigating reward
anticipation coding reported differential activity over midline
electrodes and parieto-occipital sensors (Doñamayor et al., 2012).
Differences between non-reward and reward predicting cues were
localized in the cuneus, also interpreted as a modulation by
reward information during early visual processing.
One open question concerns whether reward probability is
computed locally in the visual cortex or whether this informa-
tion is received from afferent areas coding reward value even
earlier than 150ms, either directly from midbrain dopaminer-
gic neurons or indirectly from the basal ganglia or other cortical
areas. The early latency of visual cortex response to reward value
(emerging at 90ms and peaking at 150ms) observed in the cur-
rent study is compatible with direct inputs from the substantia
nigra/VTA neurons that show short-latency responses (∼50–
100ms) to reward delivery (Schultz, 1998) and with a recent
monkey fMRI study showing that dopaminergic signals modu-
late visual cortex activity (Arsenault et al., 2013). In contrast,
this latency would have been slower if the response resulted
from polysynaptic sub-cortical or cortical routes (Thorpe and
Fabre-Thorpe, 2001).
REWARD PREDICTION ERROR CODING AT THE OUTCOME
Although ERFs emerged over occipito-temporal sensors 90ms
after each successive stop of the three spinners of the slot
machines, only after the third spinner stopped at the outcome
S2—fully informing the subject on subsequent reward/no reward
delivery—were these ERFs modulated by reward probability. The
ERFs observed during the first two time-windows most probably
reflect amotion illusion effect (Figure 4A), in line with the known
functional specialization motion-selective units in area MT and
the important role of the temporal cortex in motion perception
(Kawakami et al., 2000; Senior et al., 2000; Schoenfeld et al., 2003;
Sofue et al., 2003; Tanaka et al., 2007).
At the outcome, ERFs peaked around 300ms over temporo-
occipital sensors. The mean peak amplitudes of these ERFs
followed the properties of a reward prediction error signal
(Figures 4B, 5). That is, these peak amplitudes decreased linearly
with reward probability for rewarded outcomes. Our results show
that coding of the prediction error occurs rapidly when the third
spinner stops, and before the actual reward/no reward delivery.
Moreover, we disentangle the prediction error signal from the sig-
nal occurring at the time of reward delivery, often confounded in
fMRI studies because of its limited temporal resolution (Behrens
et al., 2008; D’Ardenne et al., 2008).
Source localization of the ERFs observed with the prediction
error identified sources such as the ACC and the posterior cin-
gulate cortex, as well as the parietal cortex. The modulation of
the peak amplitude of the ERFs by reward probability observed
at sites generated by ACC/posterior cingulate cortices may reflect
that this signal is conveyed by dopaminergic neurons, known to
exhibit discharges dependent upon reward probability (Fiorillo
et al., 2003).
The ERFs observed in the current study at the outcome, peak-
ing around 300ms after the third spinner stopped is functionally
reminiscent of both the M300, the magnetic counterpart to the
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electric P300 (Kessler et al., 2005) and the magnetic equivalent
of the feedback-related negative activity (mFRN). The FRN and
the feedback-related P300 are two ERPs components which have
been of particular interest when a feedback stimulus indicates
a win or a loss to a player in a gambling game. The FRN is a
fronto-central negative difference in the ERP following losses or
error feedback compared to wins or positive feedback, peaking
around 300ms (Holroyd et al., 2003; Yasuda et al., 2004; Hajcak
et al., 2005a,b), which may reflect a neural response to predic-
tion errors during reinforcement learning (Holroyd and Coles,
2002; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2004). The P300, a parietally distributed
ERP component, is sensitive to the processing of infrequent or
unexpected events (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005; Verleger et al., 2005;
Barcelo et al., 2007). Larger P300s are elicited by negative feed-
back when participants thought they made a correct response,
by positive feedback when participants thought they made an
incorrect response (Horst et al., 1980). Our results are in accor-
dance with previous reports of reduced amplitude of either the
FRN (Holroyd et al., 2009, 2011; Potts et al., 2011; Doñamayor
et al., 2012) or the ensuing P300 (Hajcak et al., 2005a,b) following
expected compared to unexpected non-rewarding outcomes.
As the prediction error signal found in the current study,
both the FRN and P300 evoked potentials are sensitive to stim-
ulus probability (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005; Verleger et al., 2005;
Barcelo et al., 2007; Cohen et al., 2007; Mars et al., 2008).
However, our conditioning paradigmmarkedly differs from deci-
sion making paradigms classically used to observe feedback-
related signals (Falkenstein et al., 1991; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2004;
Cohen et al., 2007; Bellebaum and Daum, 2008; Christie and Tata,
2009; Cavanagh et al., 2010), making systematic functional com-
parisons difficult. For the same reason, it is difficult to compare
our results with those of a recent MEG study using a risk aver-
sion paradigm in which subjects had to choose between two risky
gambles leading to potential losses and gains (Talmi et al., 2012).
The analysis of this study, limited to the sensor level, reported
a signal that resembled the FRN emerging around 320ms after
outcome. Although this study argued that the presence of a con-
dition with losses may strengthen conclusions regarding reward
prediction error, potential losses can also induce counterfactual
effects (Mellers et al., 1997), which is a problem when the same
reference point (i.e., no gain) is not included in each gamble
(Breiter et al., 2001). Indeed, the emotional response to the out-
come of a gamble depends not only on the obtained outcome
but also on its alternatives (Mellers et al., 1997). Thus, the neu-
ral mechanisms of feedback evaluation after risky gambles likely
involve different processes as those engaged in a simple classical
conditioning paradigm. Yet, all these paradigms indicate to the
subjects the difference between prediction and actual outcomes
and participate to different forms of reinforcement learning and
evaluation of outcomes of decisions to guide reward-seeking
behavior.
Further studies are needed to dissociate the different roles of
feedback in risky decision making, in classical and instrumen-
tal conditioning and in social decision making, involving both
common and specific neural mechanisms. For example, concern-
ing the counterfactual effect mentioned above, recent fMRI and
MEG studies investigated brain responses involved in the feeling
of regret and disappointment by manipulating the feedback par-
ticipants saw after making a decision to play certain gambles:
full-feedback (regret) vs. partial-feedback (disappointment: when
only the outcome from chosen gamble is presented) (Coricelli and
Rustichini, 2010; Giorgetta et al., 2013). Another question relates
to whether the FRN and ACC activities express salience prediction
errors rather than reward prediction errors, as suggested by recent
EEG and fMRI data using different types of rewards and punish-
ments (Metereau and Dreher, 2013; Talmi et al., 2013). Studies
manipulating different rewards and punishments are needed to
clarify this question (but see Dreher, 2013; Sescousse et al., 2013).
CONCLUSION
The current study identified the spatio-temporal characteristics
underlying reward probability coding in the human brain. It
provides evidence that the brain computes separate signals, at a
sub-second time scale, in successive brain areas along a tempo-
ral sequence when expecting a potential reward. First, processing
of reward value at the cue takes place at an early stage in visual
cortical areas, and then the anterior and posterior cingulate cor-
tices, together with the parietal cortex compute a prediction error
signal sensitive to reward probability at the time of the outcome.
Together, these results suggest that these signals are necessary
when expecting a reward and when learning probabilistic stimuli-
outcome associations. Our findings provide important insights
into the neurobiological mechanisms underlying the ability to
code reward probability, to predict upcoming rewards and to
detect changes between these predictions and rewards effectively
delivered.
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